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NOTES
INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY: AN EXAMPLE
OF AN UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Bribery,1 corrupt practices,2 and illicit payments3 aimed
at foreign officials with the power to award or renew lucrative
contracts to corporations competing in the high stakes arena of
international business continue to be common practices despite
the presence of laws prohibiting such behavior.' The United
1. The Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices es-
tablished by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ad Hoc Group) has
defined bribery as "the payment of anything of value to a decision maker (or his
agent) in order to influence his official decision-making." Corrupt Practices, Particu-
larly illicit Payments in International Commercial Transactions: Concepts and Is-
sues Related to the Formulations of an International Agreement: Report of the Sec-
retariat, Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices, U.N.
ESCOR, 2d Sess., % 23, U.N. Doc. EIAC.64/3 (1977).
2. Corrupt practices were defined broadly by the Ad Hoc Group as "unfair
competition and restrictive business practices such as market distortion, price
fixing, price discrimination, allocation of markets, rigging of bids and so on. It is
also possible to include taxes and royalties made to an illegal regime." Id. 18.
3. The term illicit payments refers to a broader definition of corrupt pay-
ments and was defined by the Ad Hoc Group as "the generic term for all pay-
ments that are made with the intention to improperly influence a decision. These
payments may be directed to officials in public service as well as to officials of
private institutions." Id. 21.
4. The reason national laws are not always effective was addressed by the
Ad Hoc Group which concluded that:
[a]lthough national laws exist in most countries with respect to
corrupt practices, they are not always effective against illicit payments in
international commercial transactions because of the transnational.., ele-
ment in the offence and its international implications.
The impediments to effective national action are many and varied.
Effective enforcement at the national level may be impeded by conflicts
of jurisdiction, the inadequacy of information available in any one State
and conflicting governmental policies towards enterprises and their activi-
ties.
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States took a strong stand against these practices by enacting
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA)5 which pro-
hibits U.S. businesses from offering bribes to foreign officials
in exchange for favorable treatment.6 Despite Congress'
hopes,' the FCPA did not lead to a multilateral agreement
outlawing international bribery.8
Today, the FCPA remains the only piece of legislation in
the world that criminalizes the bribery of foreign officials.9
From its inception, the FCPA has received a great deal of criti-
cism for isolating U.S. corporations from their competitors and
placing them on an uneven playing field because they were
forced to play by a different set of rules in competing for inter-
national business. The 1988 amendments to the FCPA'0 did
little to win any additional international support for the U.S.
anti-bribery position" and thus, the playing field remains
slanted against U.S. businesses.12
Id. %% 47-48; see also Paul Klebnikov, Joe Stalin's Heirs, FORBES, Sept. 27, 1993,
at 124 (discussing widespread corruption in Russia); Barbara Ettorre, Why Over-
seas Bribery Won't Last, MGGMT. REV., June 1994, at 20, 21. ("There are signs that
the tolerance of bribery by countries overseas is waning, even as experts caution
that the practice is still widespread. There have been some reforms, but bribery is
at a level that is still unacceptable,' says Michael Slattery Jr., an investigator at
Kroll Associates, an international investigative firm.")
5. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m(b), 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff (1988).
6. Id. § 78dd-1.
7. See S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 36,
107-08 (1975) (calling for the initiation of multilateral negotiations to establish an
international system of antibribery rules and sanctions).
8. The international efforts (led for the most part by the United States) have
yet to produce an international agreement concerning bribery and corrupt practic-
es. See discussion infra p. 387.
9. See generally Christopher L. Hall, Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: A Competitive Disadvantage, But For How Long?, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
289 (1994).
10. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended by Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901-2006 (1988).
11. As one commentator has correctly pointed out, the FCPA may have in fact
created a disincentive for other countries to act. Professor Gevurtz explains "[ilf
the United States is willing unilaterally to prohibit bribery by its nationals doing
business abroad, there is a disincentive for other trading nations to agree to en-
force similar prohibitions because this would take away a possible competitive edge
for their firms." Franklin A. Gevurtz, Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Over-
seas Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even the Odds in International
Trade, 27 VA. J. IN''L L. 211, 216 (1987).
12. There is a split in opinion concerning how badly U.S. business has actual-
ly been hurt by this law. See Bill Mintz, Ban on Bribery Hinders U.S. Companies
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The international response to bribery and the corruption of
officials is best characterized as a bureaucratic tangle of good
intentions rather than a blatant disregard for the underlying
justifications for dealing with bribery. Although many in the
international community recognize that there is a problem
with bribery, they have never been able to mobilize enough
support to deal with it effectively. One of the first failed at-
tempts to deal with the problem occurred in 1975 when the
United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution con-
demning all corrupt practices, including bribery.13 Shortly
thereafter, a working group of the Economic and Social Council
drafted an agreement on illicit payments. 4 However, this
agreement was never signed by any of the U.N. member coun-
tries, largely because of concessions that lesser developed coun-
tries (LDCs) demanded from developed countries. 5 Similarly,
attempts by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) yielded little in the way of combating
bribery on an international scale."
Past failures, however, should not thwart further attempts
to achieve an international agreement concerning bribery,
corruption and illicit payments through traditional channels.'
Abroad, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 15, 1992, at 1 (After a two-week trip through the
Middle East, then-Deputy Secretary of Energy Henson Moore observed that "Amer-
ican companies said they have a definite disadvantage in the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. The companies from other countries do not have that."). But see
Ettorre, supra note 4, at 22 (The remarks of Raymond V. Gilmartin, chairman,
president and CEO of Becton Dickinson and Company and board chairman of the
Ethics Resource Center, Tve never heard a manager say, 'We can't do business
because we're limited by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.' We are not at a com-
petitive disadvantage at all.") Although there is no consensus on the actual impact
of the FCPA on American businesses, it is safe to say that it does not help pro-
mote American business overseas. Regardless of the fact that some business per-
sons and scholars may argue that American business has not been hurt, the im-
pact of the FCPA is really a question of degree.
13. See GA. Res. 3514, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 69, U.N.
Doc. A/10034 (1976).
14. E.S.C. Res. 2041, U.N. ESCOI 61st Sess., 2032d mtg., at 17, U.N. Doc.
E/5883 (1976).
15. Bruce Seymour, Bllicit Payments in International Business: National Leg-
islation, International Codes of Conduct, and the Proposed United Nations Conven-
tion, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
219, 232 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
16. See infra pp. 394-95.
17. See Hall, supra note 9 (concluding that the international atmosphere is
changing to become more receptive to an anti-bribery agreement and that the
FCPA will set the example for this type of agreement).
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Congress approved these efforts when it enacted the FCPA.5
Therefore, the United States should continue to lead the effort
to achieve an international agreement through conventional
international channels. 9 However, considering the lack of any
successful initiatives over the past twenty years, the United
States must also pursue less traditional methods.
One reason that the United States should consider less
traditional methods is that the globalization of trade as evi-
denced by the formation of the European Union, the signing of
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), and, more
recently, the ratification of North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), makes the problem of bribery more urgent
today than ever before. This urgency stems from the fact that
unless countries come to a common understanding on a general
set of rules concerning acceptable and unacceptable behavior
among trading partners, the fear of instability and noncoopera-
tion expressed by the former U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) Carla Hills could just as easily apply to a failure in
reaching an agreement on bribery. While discussing the possi-
ble collapse of the Uruguay Round of GATT, Hills stated,
"[w]ithout internationally agreed rules trade disputes will grow
into costly trade wars, increasing the odds that the world will
splinter into giant exclusionary trading blocs." 0 Therefore, in
18. Congress stated:
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should pursue the
negotiation of an international agreement among the members of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, to govern per-
sons from those countries concerning acts prohibited with respect to issu-
ers and domestic concerns by the amendments made by this section.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5003, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1
(1988).
19. It would appear that the Clinton Administration is receptive to the goal of
eliminating international bribery. Secretary of State Warren Christopher made this
clear when he addressed the OECD in June of 1994 to discuss a "vital objective"
concerning the U.S. effort "to build an international consensus against the bribery
of foreign officials in international business transactions." Secretary Christopher,
Toward a More Integrated World, in DEP~T ST. DISPATCH, June 20, 1994, at 393,
395 (Statement at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Ministerial Meeting, Paris, France, June 8, 1994). Also, President Clinton an-
nounced, in September of 1993, a National Export Strategy, the goals of which are
to: 1) remove obstacles to trade; 2) focus U.S. global trade initiatives on the fast-
est growing regions; and 3) create new international arrangements to benefit the
United States and its partners. President William J. Clinton's Remarks Announc-
ing a National Export Strategy and an Exchange with Reporters, 29 WEEKLY
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Sept. 29, 1993).
20. Christina Morton, Market Games or Market Rules?, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
388 [Vol. XMI2
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the interim, the United States should examine the potential
use of unilateral tools2' that may prove much more effective
than the multilateral tools on which it has previously reliedY.
As one commentator stated, "if the United States wants to
even the odds in this one aspect of international trade, it must
do so by applying its own law.'
Potentially, one of the most effective unilateral tools at the
disposal of the United States is section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974.24 Section 301 addresses unfair trade practices aimed at
the United States by other nations and provides for sanctions
in response to these practices.' However, the primary inten-
tion behind section 301 is not to encourage unilateral punish-
ment of other nations but rather to provide the President with
the "negotiating leverage" to "insure fair and equitable condi-
tions for U.S. commerce" and "to eliminate [trade] bariers...
and... distortions... on a reciprocal basis."26
The goal of section 301, as one authority explained it, is
"to put a 'tool' in the hands of the USTR which can be used to
eradicate unfair trade practices and establish free and fair
trade."' Although the actual practice of bribery can certainly
be seen as an unfair advantage, it is the action (or in most
Special Supp. June 1991, at 3.
21. Although lobbying the OECD and announcing a National Export Strategy
are certainly encouraging signs, they are not entirely novel approaches to a prob-
lem that the United States has been trying to solve for nearly two decades. Some
commentators would point out that the economic world order has undergone a
drastic change since the initial passage of the FCPA and that the old methods
will yield different results in this new context. See generally Hall, supra note 9.
However, if the United States truly wants to take advantage of the changed world
order and the Clinton administration is serious about "removing obstacles to
trade," now is the time to consider using existing U.S. law to address this prob-
lem instead of relying on recycled and repackaged approaches that have yielded
little success.
22. Simply relying on the same methods of dealing with the problem of inter-
national bribery leaves the United States in a passive role. Continuing to use the
multilateral tools, while also employing U.S. laws concerning unfair trade practic-
es, makes the U.S. effort truly proactive and also shows the world that the United
States is serious about the problem of international bribery.
23. See Gevurtz, supra note 11, at 216.
24. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
25. See id.
26. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7302.
27. Howard Russell, Note, Overview of Amendments in the 1988 Omnibus
Trade Bill: Sections 301, "Super 301" and 337, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 729, 737
(1989).
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cases the inaction) that countries choose to take towards brib-
ery that make it most suitable for section 301 measures.
This Note explores, in the wake of international reluctance
to deal with the problem of bribery, how the United States can
use its existing law in the area of unfair trade practices to
level the playing field on which the FCPA has forced U.S.
businesses to play. This Note treats bribery on two different
levels. The initial focus is on bribery in general and how it
negatively affects the international economic order. However,
in order to use section 301 to deal with this problem, the ulti-
mate focus of this Note is on a foreign country's response or
lack thereof to the bribery in which its nationals are partici-
pating beyond its borders. This Note examines the potential for
and practicality of classifying bribery, corruption, and illicit
payments' as unfair trade practices as well as using section
301 to combat them. Part II of this Note examines the contin-
ued vitality of the bribery problem that warrants not only
ongoing attention from the international community, but also
justifies treating bribery as an unfair trade practice. Part III
examines the history behind the use of section 301, the neces-
sary elements required to take advantage of its protection, and
how bribery meets these requirements. Finally, Part IV de-
scribes some of the problems that applying section 301 would
inevitably create and proposes some possible solutions to these
problems.
II. Is BRIBERY WRONG?
A. Economic and Political Consequences of Bribery
Bribery creates the potential for widespread economic
damage because it misallocates money that could otherwise be
spent on worthwhile national needs. Examples of the waste
that bribery encourages can be seen throughout corruption-
plagued Italy. A Business Week article describes, 'highway
overpasses... built on towering concrete pillars-even though
the surrounding land is flat" and the existence of "superhigh-
28. The terms "bribery," "corruption" and "illicit payments" will be used inter-
changeably throughout this Note. Although there are differences in the definitions,
the author seeks to address them as a class and will often refer in this Note to
one and not the others. The reader should be aware that the arguments made by
the author refer to all three terms.
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ways to nowhere [that] begin and end abruptly."9
Bribery and corruption inflate the cost of goods. In Russia,
where corruption runs rampant, an experiment was tried in
one of the food markets in St. Petersburg in an attempt to
measure the everyday costs of corruption."0 Merchants were
offered protection by police and former KGB officers from mob
enforcers who would normally fix the price of the merchants'
goods.3' With the protection in place, the costs of the goods
declined 15 to 20%.2
Finally, bribery reduces a country's income tax revenues
while inflating its national debt. A study by the Luigi Einaudi
Research Center estimated that the Italian government's debt
was inflated by 15%, or about $200 million, because of corrup-
tion.33 Although bribery may once have been seen as an inevi-
table cost of doing business, it is quickly turning into a cost
that countries can no longer afford.
Bribery can also lead to political unrest. The 1975 disclo-
sure that United Brands Corporation agreed to pay $2.5 mil-
lion to high officials of Honduras in exchange for a tax break
on bananas led not only to the suicide of United Brands' presi-
dent, but also to a military coup that overthrew Honduran
president, Oswaldo Lopez, when he refused to grant investiga-
tors access to his banking records.34 More recent examples of
the high political toll that bribery and corruption exact can be
found in the scandals endured by the Brazilian and Italian
governments."
Moreover, direct action by government officials in accept-
ing bribes is not the only way that a political crisis may mate-
rialize. For example, Malaysia, a former British colony, recent-
ly banned the award of any government contracts to British
finns. 6 This ban resulted from an allegation that a $50,000
bribe was paid by the British corporation, George Wimpey
29. Karen Pennar et al., The Destructive Costs of Greasing Palms, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 6, 1993, at 133, 137.
30. Id. at 136.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 137.
34. JoHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 656 (1984).
35. See Ettorre, supra note 4, at 22-23.
36. See Mchael Vatikiotis, Trade Winds, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 9, 1994, at
1995]
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International, in order to secure a contract in Malaysia." Al-
though the amount of money involved was small, it was impor-
tant enough to lead to the potential breakdown of all diplomat-
ic relationships between the two countries. Furthermore, the
British government was not even directly connected to the
bribe allegation since it was allegedly passed by a private
corporation, yet the government suffered the consequences
when the bribe was revealed to the public.
B. Bribery Is Socially Unacceptable
1. The United States Response
As the British/Malaysian situation demonstrates, bribery
is generally not condoned-at least once it is publicly revealed.
The FCPA was enacted in response to a similar type of bribery
abroad, brought to light by the exposure of bribery schemes in
the United States during the 1970's." Corporate "slush
funds," uncovered during the Watergate investigations, consist-
ed of off-the-record corporate accounts that would be used to
make questionable domestic and foreign payments in order to
win influence or business. 9 Although the initial thrust of the
investigation focused on illegal campaign contributions," it
soon became apparent that many corporations involved in
questionable behavior domestically were also practicing similar
acts overseas.41 A subsequent initiative undertaken by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to encourage cor-
porations to voluntarily disclose such payments resulted in
nearly five hundred firms coming forward with confessions of
having made questionable foreign payments totaling hundreds
of millions of dollars.42 The FCPA was Congress' attempt to
clean the house of corporate America and polish the reputa-
tions of all U.S. businesses that had unfortunately been tar-
nished by these activities.43
37. Id.
38. See Shelley O'Neill, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Problems of Ex.
traterritorial Application, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 689-90 (1979).




43. CONFERENCE REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE TO ACCOMPA-
NY S. 305, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th
392 [Vol. =XI2
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Congress intended to eliminate a practice they found
"apart from being morally repugnant and illegal in most coun-
tries, simply not necessary for the successful conduct of busi-
ness [in the United States] or overseas."" Congress enacted
the FCPA under the basic premise that bribery is not only
inherently bad, but is also bad for business.45 The FCPA
unanimously passed into law due in large part to the feelings
of Congress and the American people that bribery went against
the basic tenet of the free market system, namely, that the
sale of products should take place solely on the basis of price,
quality, and service.46 Given the strong moral rationale be-
hind passage of the FCPA, as well as the belief that bribery is
undemocratic and inconsistent with American ideals,, it is
hard to imagine a politician who would want to propose a re-
peal of anti-bribery legislation and risk being labeled "pro-
corruption" or, even worse, "soft on crime."
2. The International Response
While passage of the FCPA was vigorously supported in
the United States, efforts on the international front to obtain
an international agreement similar in effect to the FCPA have
met with failure. One of the first attempts to deal with bribery
began in 1975 when the U.N. General Assembly adopted Reso-
lution 3514 by consensus," which condemned all corrupt prac-
tices, including bribery, in violation of the laws and regulations
of most countries. The resolution went on to affirm the right of
any country to adopt legislation and to investigate and take
appropriate legal action, in accordance with its national laws
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N 4098, 4101.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. However, this is not to
discount the context in which the FCPA was passed. As an expert on bribery and
its history throughout the world points out concerning the passage of the FCPA:
"[]ike a vote against obscenity in the nineteenth century, a vote against bribery in
1977 was certain of public approval in America. No member of Congress cared to
stand as the champion of corruption at home or abroad." NOONAN, supra note 34,
at 677.
47. As one commentator explained it, "[the FCPA serves pragmatic foreign
policy interests of the United States by seeking to ensure that U.S. companies,
like Caesar's wife, remain above suspicion." See Gevurtz, supra note 11, at 215.
48. GA. Res. 3514, supra note 13.
1995] 393
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and regulations, against enterprises and individuals involved
in such corrupt practices. 9 Thereafter, an Ad Hoc Intergov-
ernmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices was estab-
lished by the Economic and Social Council." This group com-
pleted a text draft agreement on illicit payments in 1979 and
went no further. The failure to proceed any further was attrib-
uted mainly to the demand by Third World countries that the
conclusion of an illicit payments agreement be linked with the
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations5 ' on which
the United Nations was also working at the time. 2 The Unit-
ed States and other Western nations believed that the call for
this linkage was inappropriate and the negotiations broke
down.5
3
Attempts by the OECD' yielded similar disappointing
results. Although OECD member states included a statement
regarding their consensus view on the elimination of bribery in
the 1976 non-binding OECD Guidelines on Multinational En-
terprises, the OECD has produced nothing more concrete in
the ensuing years. 6 Although the international effort towards
criminalizing bribery failed to achieve an agreement, the fact
that members of the United Nations and the OECD deemed it
worthy enough for the prolonged attention it received supports
the proposition that it is a problem demanding international
attention. Instead of considering the repeal of the FCPA due to
49. Id.
50. E.S.C. Res. 2041, supra note 14.
51. U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNAT'L CORPS., THE NEW CODE ENVIRONMENT, U.N.
Doc. ST/CTC/SER-A/16, U.N. Sales No. E.90..A.7 (1990).
52. See Arthur I. Aronoff, Antibribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1990 at app. C (PLI Corp. Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6904, 1990) (reprinting the Report to
Congress: Implementation of Section 5003(d) of the Trade Act of 1988, Aug. 25,
1989), available in WESTLAW, JLR Directory.
53. Id.
54. The OECD is made up of 26 member nations that comprise 16% of the
world's population and two-thirds of its goods and services. Ettorre, supra note 4,
at 21.
55. Declaration of June 21, 1976 on International Investment and Multination-
al Enterprises by Governments of OECD Member Countries, 75 DEPIT ST. BULL.
83, 84 (1976) (Annex).
56. The OECD has issued a press release reaffiming their stand against
illicit payment. OECD Governments Agree To Combat Bribery, OECD PRESS RE-
LEASE (Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Paris, Fr.), May 27, 1994. Although
this can be seen as a positive sign, it certainly does not represent a great deal of
progress over nearly two decades.
394 [Vol. XXM:2
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the failed international efforts, the U.S. position should be
bolstered by the serious consideration these international fo-
rums have granted to the problem of bribery. Furthermore, en-
couraging signs do exist that the acceptance of bribery as a
common international business practice is declining. An inter-
national group of government officials, development experts,
and businessmen, have formed an organization named Trans-
parency International (TI).57 Its stated goal is "to monitor
large-scale corruption which robs poor countries of badly-need-
ed funds."58 TI stated in its first meeting that "[c]orruption
involving public officials in large-scale business transactions is
devastating the lives of tens of millions of people and
destabilizing dozens of countries."59
Positive signs also exist within the OECD that suggest an
international agreement may still be possible. The OECD's
recently issued press release, addressing the problem of brib-
ery in international business transactions, demonstrates its
desire to witness an international agreement on bribery."
The press release echoed the concerns of TI, stating:
Bribery presents moral and political challenges and, in addi-
tion, exacts a heavy economic cost, hindering the develop-
ment of international trade and investment by raising trans-
action costs and distorting the operation of free markets. It is
especially damaging to developing countries since it diverts
needed assistance and increases the cost of assistance.61
Some encouraging signs that make the OECD initiative
more realizable are the fact that most of its members generally
57. See Tom Heneghan, New Worldwide Group Launches Anti-Corruption
Drive, Reuter Eur. Bus. Rep., May 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
REUUB File. Transparency International (TI) has received fimds from develop-
mental agencies of Sweden, Germany, France, Switzerland and Holland, as well as
two United Kingdom foundations and various corporations, including General Elec-
tric and Boeing. Tf's advisory council and board of directors include highly placed
international executives, ex-World Bank officials, as well as the former president of
Costa Rica and Nobel Laureate Oscar Arias Sanchez. Ettorre, supra note 4, at 23.
58. Heneghan, supra note 57. TI also stated that it hoped to establish "is-
lands of integrity" where government and business reject bribes. Ettorre, supra
note 4, at 24.
59. Heneghan, supra note 57.
60. See OECD Governments Agree to Combat Bribery, supra note 56.
61. Id. at 1.
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favor the elimination of bribery62 and, since the developing
nations are not members of the OECD, they cannot block the
initiative as they did in the United Nations. However, simply
because most member countries agree in principle that bribery
should be prohibited does not lead to the conclusion that a
meaningful agreement can be drafted.63 Also, the fact that the
LDCs are not present to block an agreement does not take into
consideration that these are usually the countries with the
worst bribery and corruption problems and, thus, the very
countries that such an agreement needs to reach.
Finally, the overall attitude towards bribery does not make
repeal of the FCPA a viable option. Although bribery is tolerat-
ed by many countries, even the most notoriously corrupt coun-
tries have laws that prohibit bribery. As one expert on bribery
explains, there is
[n]ot a country in the world which does not treat bribery as
criminal on its lawbooks .... In no country do bribetakers
speak publicly about their bribes, or bribegivers announce the
bribes they pay. No newspaper lists them .... No one is hon-
ored precisely because he is a big briber or bribee. 4
Therefore, the social stigma of bribery is simply too great for
the United States to ignore.
The recent responses of both governmental and nongovern-
mental agencies lend support to the effort by the United States
to eradicate bribery. After working so hard to encourage an
international agreement, it would seem foolish for the United
States to ignore these positive current developments and sim-
ply repeal the FCPA. On the contrary, these responses prove
that bribery is an international problem that demands an
international solution." The recent international political
62. See Aronoff, supra note 52.
63. In fact, Germany allows for corporate financing of political campaigns and
also permits those payments to be tax deductible. Judson J. Wambold, Note, Pro-
hibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Payments Abroad, 10
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 237 (1977).
64. NOONAN, supra note 34, at 702.
65. See NEIL H. JACOBY ET AL., BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSINESS:
A STUDY OF CORPORATE POLITICAL PAYMENTS ABROAD 142 (1977) ("In contrast
with open and aboveboard trading, free of corruption, they [bribes] involve unpro-
ductive uses of resources. They constitute wasteful barriers to international eco-
nomic intercourse, which diminish the welfare of people in both the host country
and the home country ... ").
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scandals involving bribery demonstrate its devastating effects
on governments and the countries they represent.6 The
destabilizing effect of bribery and other corrupt practices is
even more of a danger to developing countries attempting to
build economic systems that would enable them to compete in
the international community.67 If the goals of free trade are
equality and nondiscrimination," then bribery clearly does
not advance these objectives.
C. Domestic Bribery vs. International Bribery
Perhaps the biggest obstacle the United States must over-
come to justify unilateral action against bribery is eliminating
the double standard, which many countries embrace, of distin-
guishing domestic from international bribery.69 If all countries
recognize that bribery is wrong and enact laws against such
conduct aimed at their officials, what makes it any different
66. See supra pp. 390-92.
67. Ettorre, supra note 4, at 22 (Lynn Paine, an associate professor specializ-
ing in management ethics at the Harvard Business School explains, "[miany coun-
tries are learning from their own experience. You can not build trust if you have
corruption, and you can not build economic enterprise unless you have trust.").
68. See RICHARD POMFRET, UNEQUAL TRADE: THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINA-
TORY INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICIES 1 (1988).
69. Domestic bribery will be defined, for the purposes of this Note, as the
making of a secret payment to country X's official in order to influence that
official's judgment. International bribery, in contrast, is the making of a secret
payment to country Ys official by an individual or corporation of country X. Some
confusion might arise concerning the distinction between international bribery and
domestic bribery as being a false distinction. This confusion can be cleared up by
simply recognizing that although bribery laws are on the books, selective enforce-
ment or no enforcement leads to the creation of a climate that encourages bribery.
This does not help U.S. corporations doing business in such nations since they are
prohibited from bribing by the FCPA.
While domestic bribery is any bribery that would involve country X's offi-
cial, whether he is bribed by a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation, inter-
national bribery is any bribery involving country X's corporation and a foreign
official. A corporation, either domestic or foreign, may be able to get away with
bribing country Ns official because many countries do not enforce the domestic
bribery laws that are on the books (a U.S. corporation would not be able to take
advantage of this lax attitude because they are independently constrained by the
FCPA). Country X's corporation could feel free to bribe a foreign official because it
knows that its country has no law against this and any domestic law of the host
country is probably equally lax (whereas the U.S. corporation would still be faced
with complying with the FCPA). The problem that must be dealt with when ad-
dressing domestic bribery should focus on enforcement while the major problem in
international bribery is actually enacting some form of law.
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when their citizens conduct the very same act abroad, aimed at
foreign rather than domestic officials? The false distinction
between domestic and international bribery no longer has any
value in an international community that is working towards
common trade rules and regulations."0 The double standard
applied to bribery creates a barrier that inhibits free trade by
granting certain states an advantage over others. In order to
successfully remove this barrier, the disparate treatment of
international and domestic bribery must stop.
No substantive differences exist between acts of domestic
and international bribery. The only distinctions that can realis-
tically be drawn between the two acts are: 1) the location of
the action, 2) the actors involved, and 3) the benefit or harm
that the country may receive. The first two distinctions offer no
reason for countries to treat international bribery differently
from domestic bribery. The location where the bribery takes
place, whether within the country's borders or abroad, should
not matter. Once a country recognizes certain activity by its
nationals as wrong, it should punish those individuals that
commit the act, regardless of the location of the actual crime.
In fact, a strong argument can be made that committing a
criminal act in a foreign country might actually be seen as
worse. As one commentator points out, "one of the principal
rationales given by those countries ... which prosecute their
nationals for crimes committed abroad is that the crime injures
the country's reputation."' Therefore, the fact that one of the
parties to the bribe is now a foreign entity also should make no
difference.
The third distinction offers the best explanation why coun-
tries prohibit domestic bribery while simultaneously allowing,
if not encouraging, international bribery. Domestic bribery
harms a country while international bribery may actually offer
benefits to a country that allows it. International bribery offers
incentives to a country to look the other way. The same incen-
tives are not present in the area of domestic bribery and,
therefore, it is easier for the country to justify enacting laws
against this practice.
70. An example of a cooperative agreement is the USIEC Agreement on Anti-
trust Cooperation and Coordination, 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 382
(Sept. 26, 1991).
71. See Gevurtz, supra note 11, at 215 n.17.
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If corporations X and Z are competing for a contract do-
mestically and X bribes an official of that country to get the
contract, does the country benefit from this action? No, it does
not benefit for several reasons. First, if the contract is for ser-
vices, the bribe does not insure that the best company is doing
the job and the final product might suffer. For example, a
bridge may be built poorly and the country may need to invest
more money to do the job right. Second, if the contract is for a
product the same problem can occur. The product may be infe-
rior, and the consumers of the product-presumably its citi-
zens-may not be able to use it. Finally, tolerance of domestic
bribery leads to distrust of the government by the citizens,
which is certainly undesirable.
If corporation X travels overseas to compete for a contract,
X's home country now may have an incentive to look the other
way if X decides to bribe a foreign official to win the contract.
The first two factors discussed above relating to domestic brib-
ery-the double loss problem-do not apply here. If anything
goes wrong with the contract it will be the foreign country, not
the home country, that must deal with it.72 The third factor,
distrust of government, also probably would not apply. The
home country could simply say that it cannot control what its
corporations do overseas and that it had no active part in the
bribery.73 Thus, none of the disincentives present in domestic
bribery are present in international bribery. If the acquisition
of foreign business is not incentive enough to look the other
way, then the profit that the ignorant country can make cer-
tainly is a strong inducement to take no action. If X secures
overseas business, it will only serve to help its home cotintry
since the products produced by X and shipped to the overseas
customer will factor into the. home country's trade balance.
72. Of course the opposing argument is that in the long run, if corporation X
does not do a good job, then it will not get new business and this will indirectly
hurt country A. Although this is true, if corporation X continues to pay bribes in
its international dealings it probably will continue to win business and thus this
is actually another reason for country A to keep its head in the sand. The fact
that the host country must absorb the double loss is another strong practical rea-
son why countries should not be so lax in enforcing the bribery laws that are
already on their books and it also represents a practical reason why prohibiting
international bribery would help all countries involved.
73. This argument will be harder to make for countries that actually allow for
tax deduction of bribes paid to foreign officials.
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Also, a successful corporation will be making more money and
therefore paying more taxes. These are very large incentives
for home countries to ignore how its domestic corporations
obtain overseas business.
Two things must occur in order for the false distinction be-
tween international and domestic bribery to be successfully
eliminated. First, the laws against domestic bribery must be
more strictly enforced by all countries. Second, countries must
recognize the harm that their corporations can create by par-
ticipating in overseas bribery and must criminalize this activi-
ty as well. The achievement of these two requirements will
lead to a greater willingness to discuss an international solu-
tion.
III. SECTION 301 AND BRIBERY
What makes the United States so sure that the prohibition
of bribery is best for its economic and political interests as well
as the interests of the international community? The United
States has taken a leading role in attempting to negotiate an
international agreement which would condemn bribery and
illicit practices by corporations.74 Is the United States moti-
vated by a fear that it has placed its businesses out on a limb
with the passage of the FCPA? Could the U.S. actions be in
response to a realization that it might be easier to get coun-
tries to join it out on the limb, rather than to climb back and
admit it was wrong? Perhaps. However, the real reason might
be found in a growing awareness by the United States and the
other countries making up the international business commu-
nity that bribery no longer makes sense.7
5
If an international effort is to be successful, the United
States must use its influence in the international economic
community to identify bribery as a serious and urgent prob-
lem.76 The distinction between domestic and international
74. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
75. See generally Ettorre, supra note 4.
76. Ecuador is a good example of one country that is beginning to see bribery
as a serious enough problem to initiate their own unilateral action. It has recently
declared that before any company, foreign or domestic, bids on any government
contract, the senior representatives of the company must sign a statement that it
will not offer or give a bribe to any government official for that contract. The
company is also required to disclose all fees, commissions and payments given to
hired agents and middlemen. Ettorre, supra note 4, at 24.
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bribery must not be allowed to stand. The United States has
been trying to lead the way through various multilateral initia-
tives. Another way to demonstrate to the international commu-
nity that the United States is serious about eradicating bribery
would be to use section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974."
Threatening to use section 301 would send a clear message to
the rest of the world that the United States considers bribery a
top priority. The threat may force other countries to re-evalu-
ate the different standards they apply to domestic and interna-
tional bribery. The possibility of section 301 sanctions may
make the incentives of ignoring international bribery unattrac-
tive to these countries.
The goal of reaching an international agreement concern-
ing bribery should not be abandoned. Section 301 should sim-
ply be seen as another avenue to explore in this ultimate pur-
suit. Keeping in mind the ultimate goal of an international
agreement, two principles should be stated and strictly ad-
hered to in the use of section 301. First, the goal must always
focus on improving the overall international business commu-
nity not simply the fortunes of U.S. businesses. Second, if an
international agreement is eventually achieved through other
more conventional means, section 301 would not be necessary
and, therefore, should not be used. Faithfully adhering to these
two principles may take some of the sting out of using section
301 unilaterally and place it in a more acceptable, multilateral
context.
A. The History of Section 301
The idea that the United States should be able to take
action against countries guilty of unfair trade practices is well
established. The earliest examples of power granted to the
President to respond to unfair trade practices date back to the
presidency of George Washington,7 when the U.S. Supreme
Court decided to uphold the statutory power granted to the
President to impose retaliatory tariffs.79 This tradition contin-
77. Trade Act of 1974 § 301.
78. See K. Blake Thatcher, Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974:
Its Utility Against Alleged Unfair Trade Practices by the Japanese Government, 81
Nw. U. L. REV. 492, 495 (1987) (citing 1 Stat. 372 (1794)).
79. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (upholding the Tariff Act of Oct. 1,
1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567); see also Thatcher, supra note 78, at 495.
1995]
BROOK. J. INTL L.
ued through the 1930 Tariff Act and its 1934 amendments
which required, rather than allowed, the President to impose
duties on articles in certain instances of discrimination against
U.S. products."0 The modern predecessor to section 301 was
section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.81 Sdction
252(c) broadened the presidential power to take action in dis-
criminatory trade relationships by giving the president the
power to suspend trade agreements with nations whose import
restrictions "'directly or indirectly substantially burden[ed]
United States commerce.'8 2
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 19748 further expanded
the executive branch's discretionary power in the area of unfair
trade practices. This expansion was accomplished by abandon-
ing the direct/indirect description of trade restrictions. The
President was allowed to take reta.iatory action when he de-
termined that a foreign nation maintained a trade restriction
that was "unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory and
burden[ed] or restrict[ed] United States commerce." 4 Similar
to section 252(c), section 301 allows the President to "sus-
pend.., or prevent the application of, or refrain from pro-
claiming, benefits of trade agreement concessions." 5 However,
this power was also increased by allowing the President to
impose import restrictions on goods. 6
Amendments were made to section 301 through the Trade
Agreements Act of 19797 and the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984.88 The first set of amendments dealt with three issues.
First, the President was given the express authority to pursue
U.S. rights under any applicable trade agreement. 9 The sec-
80. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1677k (1988); see Thatcher, supra
note 78, at 495.
81. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252(c), 76 Stat. 872,
879-80, repealed by Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1988); see Thatch-
er, supra note 78, at 495.
82. See Thatcher, supra note 78, at 495 (emphasis added) (citing the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 § 252(c)).
83. Trade Act of 1974 § 301.
84. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B) (1982).
85. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1982).
86. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(2) (1982).
87. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (1988).
88. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 301-307, 98 Stat.
2948, 3000-3013 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1986)).
89. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1982).
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ond and third issues addressed foreign relations concerns by
setting time limits for the conclusion of section 301 investiga-
tions90 and requiring simultaneous consultations with the for-
eign nation that was the subject of the investigation.9' The
second set of amendments established new negotiating objec-
tives, provided specific examples of foreign practices that
would warrant action,92 and required the USTR to make an
annual report to Congress concerning trade barriers to U.S. ex-
ports.93
The most recent amendments to section 301 were included
in the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill94 (Trade Bill). The two most
important changes that these amendments introduced were a
distinction between mandatory and discretionary action95 and
the shifting of power from the President to the USTR in mak-
ing the final determination on whether certain practices war-
rant section 301 action.9" Both of these amendments were
signs that Congress sanctioned more aggressive use of section
301.9'
Although section 301 finds its roots in imperialism and
protectionism, its viability as a tool to further the goals of free
and fair trade should not be ignored. The elimination of inter-
national bribery certainly advances the goal of insuring "fair
and equitable conditions for U.S. commerce," 8 but it also has
the effect of insuring those same conditions for international
90. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(1)(A) (1982).
91. 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (1982).
92. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B) (1988).
93. Id. § 2241(b).
94. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (1988).
95. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982), amended by 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
96. Id.
97. Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act:
A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
49, 49 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990). As Hippler and Holmer
explained:
The message was loud and clear: Congress was dissatisfied with the
direction and results of U.S. trade policy. Many congressmen complained
that "trade is the handmaiden of all other considerations of the U.S.
government," and that considerations of foreign relations, national securi-
ty, foreign and domestic economics, and domestic politics "have crowded
trade off the agenda."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
98. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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commerce. The use of section 301 in the past may have sig-
naled a focus on U.S. interests over and above the interests of
other nations. However, with the emergence of a new world
trade order, the best interests of the United States and those
of the rest of the international economic community can no
longer be seen as mutually exclusive. The use of section 301, at
least in the context of combating bribery, is an instance where
aggressive unilateralism99 can actually advance the goal of
establishing a multilateral world trading regime.0 0
B. Discretionary Action Authorized by Section 301
Section 301 both mandates that the USTR take action
against a specific country"0 ' and authorizes the USTR to take
99. This term has been used by authorities to describe section 301 action.
Traditionally section 301 was seen as the most powerful tool in the United States'
trade arsenal. This is still true today. However, the use of section 301 in the
context of eliminating bribery is a slightly different application. Instead of using it
to insure that U.S. interests are respected, the use of section 301 to combat brib-
ery insures that international and universal interests are respected. See, e.g.,
Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGRESSIVE
UNLATERALISM, supra note 97, at 1.
100. One authority noted that there are potentially different goals or purposes
for using section 301. See Thatcher, supra note 78, at 514 n.181. The specific
purpose may determine whether the use of section 301 in a particular instance
conflicts with international law. Id. Among some of the purposes the use of section
301 could seek to achieve are: the unilateral establishment of guaranteed recip-
rocal market shares for U.S. exporters, the protection of United States industry
from unfair trading practices by foreign nations, and export promotion to the ex-
tent the United States attempts unilaterally to force other nations to guarantee
U.S. exporters a certain market share. Id. All of these would conflict with the
principles of international trade law. Id. However, Thatcher goes on to state that
if the purpose was simply "to publicize the trade barriers of other nations for the
purpose of inducing reduction of these barriers-the potential for technical conflict
with provisions of international law does not seem to exist." Id. at 514-15 n.181.
Similarly, if the goal of using section 301 is to benefit the international trade com-
munity, with the United States just being one member that would share this
benefit, then this would not seem to conflict with international trade law.
101. Section 301 requires the USTR to take specific action if any one of three
situations is found to exist. The USTR shall take action against a country if: 1)
"the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being violated," 2)
"an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country violates, or is inconsistent with, the
provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under any trade
agreement," or 3) if "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unjustifiable
and burdens or restricts United States commerce." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(A)-(B)
(1988). The act defines "unjustifiable" as any act, policy or practice which is "in
violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United
States . . . [or] . . . which denies national or most-favored nation treatment or the
right of establishment or protection of intellectual property rights." 19 U.S.C. §
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action on a discretionary basis. The USTR is granted discre-
tionary power to take actions against a country, under the
direction of the President, if the USTR determines that acts,
policies or practices are "unreasonable" or "discriminatory" and
burden or restrict U.S. commerce."2 Defined as unreason-
able, is any "act, policy or practice, while not necessarily in
violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights
of the United States, is otherwise unfair and inequitable." 3
An act, policy or practice meets the discriminatory standard if
it "denies... most-favored nation treatment to United States
goods, services or investment."10 4
Unlike the requirement imposed on mandatory action,
discretionary action is much more flexible.' ° It allows for re-
sponses to actions that are neither violations of already exist-
ing trade agreements nor violations of international rights of
the United States, but are nonetheless seen to be "unreason-
able"'0 6 or "discriminatory."'0 7 As between the two qualify-
ing terms, unreasonable is more flexible than discriminato-
ry.'O8 A section 301 claim addressing the toleration of bribery
would fall within the definition of an unreasonable policy or
practice.0 9 Although it is possible to envision bringing a sec-
tion 301 action against a state for an "unreasonable" act,"0 in
2411(d)(4)(A)-(B) (1988).
The United States could not use this portion of section 301 to attack brib-
ery. The mandatory action section is reserved for fairly limited situations. It is
only triggered if there is a violation of an already existing trade agreement or if
an established international right of the United States is broken. Since no trade
agreement is currently in place that deals with the issue of bribery and the treat-
ment of bribery is far from an international standard, the United States would
have to look to addressing bribery through the discretionary acts allowed by sec-
tion 301.
102. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1988).
103. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(A) (1988).
104. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(5) (1988).
105. See Thatcher, supra note 78, at 514 n.181.
106. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1988).
107. Id.
108. Although "unreasonable" is defined by the statute, the words used to give
it meaning, "unfair and equitable" are no less ambiguous and open for interpreta-
tion than "unreasonable."
109. See 19 U.S.C. 2411(b)(1) (1988).
110. Id. An unreasonable act would occur if a country actively encouraged brib-
ery, for example, or if the country itself participated in a bribery scheme. It could
be argued that a country actively encouraged bribery by allowing tax deductions
for bribes paid, much like what is done in Germany. These cases would seem to
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all likelihood, such an action would be brought against a na-
tion only for its willful blindness to bribery by its nationals.
A section 301 action for tolerance of bribery is not simply
created by a judicious reading of the already flexible "unrea-
sonable" standard. There is support for this type of action
found in the statute. Congress chose to not only define "unrea-
sonable," but also to provide several examples of what would
constitute "unreasonable" practices within the purview of the
statute. An example of an "unreasonable" practice is:
(B)... any act, policy or practice or any combination of acts,
policies or practices, which (i) denies fair and equitable...
(III) market opportunities, including the toleration by a for-
eign government of systematic anticompetitive activities by
private firms or among private firms in the foreign country
that have the effect of restricting, on a basis that is inconsis-
tent with commercial considerations, access of United States
goods to purchasing by such firms."
Applying this example to a country's tacit approval of "interna-
tional" bribery would seem to yield a practice that falls square-
ly within ."a toleration by a foreign government of systematic
anticompetitive activities by private firms."1
The use of section 301 against the toleration of bribery
would clearly liberalize international trade. Therefore, there
should be little concern about its use in this context for purely
political reasons. In fact, the application of the unreasonable
standard to eliminate bribery promotes one of the stated goals
of the statute which is "to authorize the negotiation of new
agreements that establish new international legal norms in
areas of emerging importance to the United States econo-
my.""3 The primary goal of defining the toleration of bribery
be fairly clear cut and would not raise many troubling issues as far as meeting
the substantive requirements of a section 301 action.
111. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)D (1988) (emphasis added).
112. See id.
113. Section 302 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 states that the statute's
purposes include encouraging "the expansion of.. . international trade in services
through the negotiation of agreements . . . which reduce or eliminate barriers to
international trade in services," and enhancing 'the free flow of foreign direct
investment through the negotiation of agreements . . . which reduce or eliminate
the trade distortive effects of certain investment-related measures."' See Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 2102 note (1988); see also Patricia I. Hansen, De-
fining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of
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as an unreasonable act, policy or practice and using section
301 to combat it is to achieve a new international agreement
that will establish a universal norm prohibiting bribery. The
emerging importance of this goal applies not only to the U.S.
economy but also to the economy of the international communi-
ty.l114
C. Substantive Requirements of Section 301 Applied to Bribery
A private party may only petition for the use of section
301 powers if it meets four requirements." 5 The party must
be able to prove: (1) proper subject matter jurisdiction exists
for the USTR to take the case, (2) the private party has stand-
ing as an interested party, (3) injury resulting from the foreign
trade practice, as defined by section 301, and (4) a substantive
violation of section 301.116 An American corporation could
easily meet these four substantive requirements and thus
petition the President and the USTR to use their powers under
section 301 against bribery.
1. Jurisdiction
Section 301 has traditionally been used in a wide array of
areas involving unfair trade practices by foreign governments.
These areas range from silk and leather to aluminum baseball
bats and tobacco products."7 Although initially section 301
was aimed specifically at goods, subsequent amendments have
established that its powers can also be enlisted to cover peti-
tions involving services and foreign investment. The broad
jurisdictional scope of section 301 makes it difficult to imagine
a petitioner that would fail to fall within its range. A petitioner
raising a claim of bribery as an unfair trade practice should be
able to meet the subject matter jurisdiction requirement
whether the claim is in a relatively new area like financial
services offered in former Communist Eastern European coun-
1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122 (1987).
114. See supra part II.B.
115. A section 301 action can be initiated by the USTR without a petition from
a private party as well Additionally, even when a private party does make a
petition that meets all the substantive requirements, the USTR still maintains
discretion concerning whether or not to proceed. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
116. See Thatcher, supra note 78, at 500.
117. Id.
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tries or in a more traditional area like military products of-
fered to the Middle East.
2. Standing Under Section 301
A private party initiating a section 301 action must qualify
as an "interested party."'18 However, like the jurisdictional
requirement, the standing requirement is broad enough that it
does not pose a serious problem to an otherwise legitimate
claim. Congress defined interested party in section 301 as a
party that "includes, but is not limited to, domestic firms and
workers, representatives of consumer interests, United States
product exporters, and industrial users of any goods or servic-
es .... ,"' Applying this broad definition of standing it would
seem that everyone from General Electric to Ralph Nader
would satisfy the standing requirement to bring a section 301
petition.
3. Injury Under Section 301
According to section 301, a practice by a foreign country
only becomes actionable if it "burdens or restricts United
States commerce."'20 Once again the actual requirement set
forth in section 301 is not very hard to meet. The definition of
"interested party" makes section 301 more lenient than other
U.S. trade laws, as well as GATT customs. Whereas both
GATT customs and other U.S. trade laws frown on complaints
that allege de minimis effects, section 301 does not require
that the petitioner suffer direct injury but rather that the
petitioner have some interest in the foreign trade practice that
caused the burden or restriction.'
Even with this lessened burden of proof, this requirement
may still be the most difficult to prove. A firm that wins busi-
ness by bribing a foreign official will probably not be quick to
make this practice public knowledge. Nor will the foreign offi-
cial who accepted the bribe be forthcoming with this informa-
tion. Furthermore, complaining about losing a bid to a competi-
tor because of bribery may be characterized by both the win-
118. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988).
119. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(9) (1988).
120. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1988).
121. See Thatcher, supra note 78, at 502.
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ning party and the government as simply a case of sour
grapes. In this type of situation, the assistance of outside agen-
cies such as TI may prove particularly helpful.'22 Indepen-
dent verification that bribery occurred in a specific transaction
or that it is known to be tolerated by a particular government
may lend substantial reliability to an otherwise unsubstantiat-
ed claim made by the losing party of a bid.
4. Substantive Violations Under Section 301
The term "substantive violation," as applied to section 301,
simply means that a party must allege that the conduct of a
foreign government was: (1) violative of international agree-
ments, (2) unjustifiable, (3) unreasonable, or (4) discriminato-
ry." As stated previously, the flexible definition given to the
term "unreasonable" makes it the most likely category of viola-
tions within which bribery would fall. A government's tolera-
tion of bribery, while not necessarily in violation of, or incon-
sistent with, the "rights of the United States under any trade
agreement,' 24 could be convincingly presented as "unreason-
able or discriminatory.""
As one commentator correctly pointed out, the real ques-
tion that must be addressed when a petitioner brings a claim
alleging an "unreasonable" trade practice that is "unfair and
inequitable" is what type of practice would be seen as "fair and
equitable."'26 There are generally three understandings of
what "fair and equitable market opportunities" should mean.
The use of section 301 against bribery is consistent with the
most reasonable and least controversial of these definitions.
The first definition of "fair and equitable" requires that the
market share of an American exporter in a particular good or
service to the country in question be roughly equivalent to the
market share held by exporters of that country to the United
States.12 This approach has been criticized as being too
"wooden" as well as being in contradiction with the theory of
122. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
123. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988). The failure of a country to take action against
bribery comprises government action. See infra pp. 414-18.
124. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(A) (1988).
125. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1988).
126. See Thatcher, supra note 78, at 504.
127. Id.
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comparative advantage.'" The second definition requires a
market share for the frmns of each nation in proportion with
the market share of firms in the rest of the world market.
129
The obvious shortcoming of this approach rests on the fact that
it tries to establish a market share based on what a firm does
in the rest of the world without looking at the energy it exert-
ed in the particular nation. The third approach, the "free
trade" model, simply requires that each nation assure that
trade barriers would be eliminated and that other nations
would have a fair and equitable opportunity to obtain a market
share.13
This "free trade" definition, with its focus on equal oppor-
tunity, is squarely in line with the U.S. attempt to simply
"level the playing field" by eliminating bribery. Multilateral
gain must remain the ultimate goal of using section 301 as a
unilateral weapon. Using the free trade model to define a rea-
sonable market opportunity ensures that the goal of the United
States will remain a level playing field of international trade.
D. Using Section 301 To Get Countries To The Negotiating
Table
Although the United States should be ready to back up its
section 301 threat with appropriate sanctions, the best case
scenario is for the threat of section 301 action to lead to mean-
ingful negotiations rather than unilateral punishment. Initial-
ly, the threat of section 301 action could be used to achieve
bilateral agreements between targeted countries.13' The Unit-
ed States could then build on these bilateral successes by at-
tempting to motivate countries to consider forming regimes or
other regionalized responses to the problem of bribery.32
128. Id. at 504, 518.
129. Id. at 504.
130. Id.
131. See infra Part ]II.E for a discussion of how the United States should
choose the countries that should be the target of section 301 threats.
132. The United States has used section 301 threats in the past aimed not at
a particular country but rather at a group of countries. The United States has
brought section 301 action against European Community poultry export subsidies
and European Community wheat and wheat flour export subsidies. See JAMES
BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD 238 (1991). The United States could again use
this approach to encourage the current members of the European Union to inde-




These localized reactions could eventually lead to a univer-
sal agreement. However, even if they did not, they still could
prove to be very helpful in the overall fight against bribery.
Moreover, the fact that localized movements could be formed
more easily than a worldwide coalition and offer potentially
greater enforcement ability may actually make a regimented
response to bribery a more attractive option. Although a uni-
versal agreement might still be the best long term goal, region-
al regimes may be the best short term, practical and temporary
solution, while at the same time acting as an essential building
block for a truly universal agreement.
The threat of section 301 action may also be successful in
bringing countries to the negotiating table by playing the pow-
ers of the executive and legislative branches against each oth-
er. As one commentator has put it, "[a] thinly veiled message
conveyed across the negotiating table would go something like
this: 'Come to terms with the president, or face the prospect of
drastic punishment from the United States Congress.""33 The
separation of powers excuse might also provide a very practical
response to other countries that claim the use of section 301 is
really against fair trade. An administration forced to deal with
this very real criticism "might welcome the chance to point a
finger at the legislature, whose militancy presumably left the
government no alternative."134 This political version of the
good cop/bad cop3 5 scenario might lead other countries to de-
cide it is not worth the gamble that the President may be able
to reign in congressional protectionist fervor and avoid using
section 301. Negotiation might be a more attractive alternative
to being in the middle of a domestic political battle between
Congress and the President.3
E. What The United States Should Do If Section 301 Does Not
Bring Countries To The Negotiating Table-Possible Penalties
Although the United States might use section 301 as an
effective scare tactic to convince countries to enter into negotia-
133. See PIErRO S. NIVOLA, REGULATING UNFAIR TRADE 122 (1993).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The use of the good cop/bad cop routine might be the most useful and
practical, not to mention, the only real weapon available to President Clinton in
light of the shift of power in Congress from Democratic to Republican control.
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tions concerning international bribery, this practice will repre-
sent a transparent bluff if the United States is not prepared to
take retaliatory action against those countries that fail to re-
spond. Congress was aware of the practical use of section 301
as a tool to encourage negotiation.37 However, Congress also
meant to create a statute with real teeth, that would not be
interpreted by foreign countries as simply a paper tiger. 3 '
The United States must formulate a realistic response to a
country's decision not to address the problem of international
bribery.
The issue essentially centers around the proper scope of
retaliation. Should the United States focus its retaliation on a
single industry, perhaps the one that was hurt by the tolera-
tion of bribery? Or should the retaliatory action be more wide-
spread based upon the assumption that toleration of bribery is
a government practice or policy that is not limited to one in-
dustry but is present in all of them? Based upon past section
301 actions, as well as the wording of the act itself, it appears
that a narrow, focused and, most importantly, a proportionate
response would be most appropriate to a country that refused
to negotiate when threatened with possible section 301 action.
Another issue that arises concerning possible penalties is
which countries should be targeted for section 301 action.
There are at least two different ways to approach this problem.
Either the United States could target those countries where
bribery and corruption is found to be the most rampant or it
could target countries where a changed policy towards bribery
would yield the greatest benefits to U.S. trade. If the main goal
of using section 301 to combat bribery is consistency, then the
United States must target the most" notorious countries for
section 301 action rather than those countries that will possi-
137. Legislative history reveals that Congress felt that the power granted to
the president "may also serve as negotiating leverage to reduce trade distortidns
on a reciprocal basis." S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1974), reprint-
ed in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1786, 7302.
138. The real bite intended by Congress is evident in the comments of the
Senate Finance Committee in its report on the Trade Act of 1974. This report
states that Congress intended section 301 powers to "be exercised vigorously to
insure fair and equitable conditions for U.S. commerce." Id. It went on to explain
that "this retaliation authority'" was not intended to "be a dead letter [for]
[floreign trading partners should know that we are willing to do business with
them on a fair and free basis, but if they insist on maintaining unfair advantages,
swift and certain retaliation against their commerce will occur." Id.
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bly lead to an increase in U.S. exports.
Improving the overall international business community
should remain the goal of any section 301 action aimed at
bribery. Thus, any positive effect on U.S. trade due to section
301 action or the threat of such action should amount to only
collateral benefits. That is not to say that U.S. trade should
not or will not benefit from eliminating bribery. However, in
order to effectively deflect criticism that the United States is
using section 301 only to advance its own international trade
goals, the multilateral nature of using section 301 in this con-
text should continue to be stressed.
IV. OBSTACLES TO USING SECTION 301 AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY
There have been and always will be critics arguing against
the use of section 301 action. However, applying section 301 to
bribery places it in a unique context. Section 301, when used
against bribery, is a unilateral tool being used to advance a
multilateral goal. Detractors may simply state that framing
the fight against bribery as a multilateral goal is actually a
convenient pretext for gaining a greater advantage for U.S.
businesses. It cannot be ignored that bribery creates real dam-
age to countries and can be avoided by the use of section 301.
Of course, there are some practical problems that the use of
section 301 will inevitably create and that must be anticipated
and addressed.
A. Foreign Policy Concerns
One of the most practical problems with using section 301
is the foreign policy complications it may create. Even though
section 301 can be used to combat international bribery, the
more important question is whether it should be used. Is it an
"cappropriate" tool? As one commentator explained it, politically
"the United States must recognize that foreign practices and
policies reflect delicate political balances that a foreign gov-
ernment may be unable or unwilling to disturb."13 9 Section
301 has always been a target for supporters of GATT and the
European Union who claim that such a unilateral tool has no
139. Hansen, supra note 113, at 1128.
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place in an international community striving for free trade."'
However, the opposite side of this argument really carries
much more weight when applying section 301 to the problem of
bribery. First, the international trade agreements currently in
place do not have effective enforcement mechanisms and the
ones they do have in place are too slow and easily ignored.'
Thus, section 301 is still necessary to protect American inter-
ests that otherwise would go unprotected. Also, the interna-
tional community in general has not been willing or able to
solve the problem of bribery, so it is not unreasonable for the
United States to attempt to solve it through different means.
Second, there is more than a little hypocrisy in arguing that
the use of section 301 to combat international bribery hurts
free trade, when it is these same countries' toleration of brib-
ery that has created the unfair advantage and the need to use
section 301 in the first place. It is also important to look at
why section 301 is being used in this instance.' Section 301
is not being used to help create an added advantage for the
United States but, rather, it is being used to level the playing
field of international competition.
B. Using Section 301 Against Bribery Satisfies the
Requirement of State Action
Opponents of section 301 in the bribery context may argue
that its use would not satisfy the state action requirement.
However, the toleration of bribery and, in some cases, its actu-
al encouragement unquestionably satisfies the statutory re-
quirement of state action.' Additionally, one does not need
to rely solely on the language of the statute to see that the
requirement of state action is satisfied. A favorable comparison
can be made between a country's toleration of international
bribery by its nationals and its refusal to protect the intellectu-
al property of another nation. In the case of bribery, it is the
private corporation that is making the bribe. Similarly, in the
140. See Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good
and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISIM, supra note 97, at 113, 113-14.
141. See generally Marjorie Minkler, The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, Section
301: A Permissible Enforcement Mechanism or a Violation of the United States'
Obligations Under International Law?, 11 U. PrIT. JL. & COM. 283 (1992).
142. See supra p. 403.
143. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1988).
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case of intellectual property, it is the private corporation that
is abusing the intellectual property of another. The United
States has successfully used section 301 in situations involving
disregard for intellectual property although the state was tech-
nically not committing the violations. The same logic can be
applied to bribery.
1. The Thailand Example: No Action Can Constitute State
Action
The situation concerning Thailand and intellectual proper-
ty is illustrative of the U.S. position that a state's refusal to
address an obvious unfair trade practice does constitute state
action as required by section 301.' The successful threat of
section 301 action against Thailand in order to motivate the
Thai government to modify its very lax attitude towards the
protection of intellectual property lends support to the theory
that section 301 can be used just as effectively against brib-
ery.4 The fact that section 301 was successful despite seri-
ous problems in its implementation is of even greater impor-
tance since these same problems are, arguably, not present
when dealing with bribery.
The action taken against the Thai government was actual-
ly initiated under what has come to be known as "Special 301."
Therefore, a general overview of the particular provisions and
powers that constitute Special 301 is appropriate before ad-
dressing its application in a specific situation.
a. Special 301 of the 1988 Trade Act
Multilateral efforts, discussed previously in this Note as
applied to bribery, have also been initiated by LDCs as well as
by developed countries in response to the growing problem of
intellectual property protection.'46  However, the United
144. See generally Preeti Sinha, Special 301: An Effective Tool Against
Thailand's Intellectual Property Violations, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 281, 285
(1992).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar.
20, 1883, revised at Stockholm, July, 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305;
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3; Berne Convention for the Protection of Lit-
erary and Artistic Works, Sept 9, 1886, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828
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States went a step further in its response by including special
unilateral tools for the protection of intellectual property in the
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.'47 In short,
Special 301 provides for retaliatory trade measures instituted
by the executive branch against any country that continually
allows the production and sale of pirated goods."' The USTR
tempered the effect of Special 301 by creating a 'Watch List"
and a "Priority Watch List."' By placing countries on either
of these two lists, the USTR accomplished the goal of notifying
the listed countries that they were in danger of suffering trade
sanctions for their policies towards intellectual property, while
also opening the possibility of bilateral negotiation and fore-
stalling the institution of any actual sanctions. 5 °
b. Thailand and Intellectual Property
Thailand did not have an official state policy that sanc-
tioned- the abuse of intellectual property. However, the
government's lax attitude towards intellectual property pro-
tection resulted in estimated losses to the U.S. copyright indus-
try of $70 to $100 million in 1990,151 as well as annual losses
of $25 to $100 million in the pharmaceutical industry due to
patent piracy. 5" In both industries, these losses were brought
to the attention of the USTR by U.S. copyright associations
that filed section 301 petitions as "interested persons." These
petitions led the USTR to place Thailand on the "Priority
Watch List."
In response to the action taken by the USTR, the Thai
government passed stricter copyright laws that became effec-
tive in January of 19922"3 These new laws extended protec-
tion to service and collective marks and provided for heavy
penalties against violators." Efforts were also initiated by
the Thai government to confiscate pirated goods and use them
as evidence for prosecuting those responsible for the commer-
U.N.T.S. 221.
147. See supra note 97.
148. Sinha, supra note 144.
149. Id. at 289 (footnote omitted).
150. Id. at 290.
151. Id.





cial piracy.'55 Similar legislation was also passed by Thailand
granting greater protection to pharmaceutical patents.
15 6
However, since some major problems concerning infringement
of pharmaceutical patents were not addressed, Thailand con-
tinued to be the target of a USTR investigation.57 But the
pressure of section 301 action seems to be working since the
Thai government recently has indicated its willingness to con-
tinue to enact and enforce stiffer intellectual property legisla-
tion.5 8
The problems of intellectual property protection and brib-
ery are really quite similar. In each case it is a state's inaction
that leads to unfair trade practices. As the United States has
proven through the use of Special 301 against Thailand, such
apathy can and does constitute state action.
2. Business and Cultural Barriers Do Constitute State Action
The idea that business and cultural barriers amount to
state action as defined under section 301 is really very closely
related to, and perhaps is an extension of, the previous discus-
sion concerning Thailand and a country's inactivity in the face
of obvious unfair trade practices occurring within its borders.
Business and cultural barriers are practices by private groups
such as the establishment of distribution systems,'59 interde-
pendent seller-buyer relationships 6 ' and buy-national atti-
tudes.' Although several problems exist in proving that
bribery as a business or cultural barrier amounts to state ac-
tion, a petitioner should be able to successfully overcome these
difficulties.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 293.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 297.
159. U.S. businesses can find themselves at a disadvantage due to the complex,
multilayered distribution systems of countries like Japan that can make "retail
prices on imported consumer durables . . . two to three times greater than compa-
rable Japanese products'" See Thatcher, supra note 78, at 531 n.277 (citation
omitted).
160. Id. at 531.
161. Id. There is an attitude among many government officials, importers, dis-
tributors, and end-users to "tend to prefer domestic products even where foreign
goods are cheaper, incorporate novel design features, or are of higher quality." Id.
at 531 n.279 (citation omitted).
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The recent semiconductor case against Japan162 would
support a petitioner's claim that bribery is an industry-wide
business practice, condoned by the host government which
effectively sets up barriers to U.S. business. In the Japanese
semiconductor case, the Semiconductor Industry Association
condemned the whole Japanese market structure, rather than
just targeting the practice of one company, as creating unrea-
sonable trade barriers to semiconductor imports from the Unit-
ed States.163
Although the case was settled, leaving technical questions
concerning the particular business and cultural barriers unad-
dressed, the settlement did produce a promise by Japan to
'"encourage' its producers and users of chips to 'take advantage
of the increased availability of foreign-made products in their
market."'" A similar nationwide appeal could be made
against a country's tolerance of bribery by its industries. This
appeal could motivate a country to take at least initial steps to
prevent or discourage bribery. 6 '
C. Section 301 is Consistent with its Own Legislative History
and the Legislative History of the FCPA
The legislative history of both the FCPA and section 301
supports section 301's use against bribery in the international
business community. While Congress has specifically mandated
that the President make efforts to reach an international
agreement on this issue, no such agreement has been forth-
coming. Therefore, it is an appropriate time to begin examining
other avenues that may lead to greater success in a shorter
period of time.
Although Congress expressed its preference for traditional
international channels to address bribery, 66 it did not fore-
close the possibility of using unilateral methods to deal with
the problem. Congress requested that the President submit,
162. Semiconductor Indus. Ass'n, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,866 (1985) (initiation of inves-
tigation under section 301) (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative).
163. See Thatcher, supra note 78, at 532.
164. Id. (footnote omitted).
165. Of course the best first step towards this end would be to simply choose
to strictly enforce the bribery laws that are on the books rather than look the
other way.




within one year after the enactment of the FCPA, "a report on
the progress of the negotiations""' towards an international
agreement. Congress went on to state that if "these negotia-
tions do not successfully eliminate any competitive disadvan-
tage of United States businesses,"16 then the President
should also advise Congress on "those steps which the exec-
utive branch and Congress should consider taking"'69 in order
to better address this problem. The report to Congress essen-
tially skirted the issue by claiming that it was too early to
advise that any different action be taken.7 ' It has been five
years since this presidential report was issued and no notable
progress has been made towards an international agree-
ment.' Congress' approval for considering other steps to
eliminate bribery is explicitly stated in the FCPA. Therefore,
the United States should now consider the use of unilateral
means to address the problem of bribery.
D. The Use of Section 301 is Consistent with GATT
Many critics of section 301 claim that it is inconsistent
with GATT and, therefore, the United States should not be
allowed to employ it. 72 However, using section 301 to combat
international bribery can be seen as not only consistent with
GATT but also a major step towards one of GATT's primary
goals which is achieving a necessary symmetry of rights and
obligations. 73 Using section 301 in this particular context is
trade augmenting rather than trade reducing. It insures that
world trade is not only freer, but fairer as well. There are two
major arguments to counteract the claim that using section
301 against bribery is inconsistent with GATT. First, using
section 301 against bribery is justified disobedience. Second,
the United States is simply holding the rest of the internation-
al economic community to a standard to which they have al-
ready agreed.
167. Id. § 5003(d)(2)(i).
168. Id. § 5003(d)(2)(ii).
169. Id.
170. See Aronoff, supra note 52.
171. See notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Thatcher, supra note 78, at 514 n.181.
173. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRES-
SIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 97, at 2, 37.
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The selective use of section 301 action or simply the threat
of its use .will make it more consistent with GATT's objectives.
In addition, the requirement included in the latest amend-
ments which mandate that the USTR begin negotiating with a
country the day an investigation commences, shows that the
initiation of bilateral negotiation is the primary goal of section
301. This goal is clearly sanctioned by the GATT.
1. Justified Disobedience
The altruistic argument that unilateralism has to be used
in order to save multilateralism can certainly be applied to the
use of section 301 to combat bribery.'74 Indeed, justified dis-
obedience of GATT's provisions has a place in combating brib-
ery.'75 GATT is acknowledged as a somewhat inefficient and
ineffective agreement that often needs a jolt to achieve its pur-
poses. Using section 301 against bribery is just the jolt the
GATT needs. As one authority explained, "GATT law needs
additional pressures to function effectively, and... Section
301 is an appropriate form of pressure to meet this need."7 '
The inherent shortcomings of GATT, namely its ineffective
enforcement mechanisms and its painfully slow process of law
reform, make justified disobedience all the more relevant when
dealing with bribery. In certain prescribed instances, a country
should be allowed to step outside the GATT framework if it
follows certain prearranged guidelines. Professor Hudec has
proposed five substantive guidelines that could be applied to
activity outside the sphere of GATT. They are:
i) The objective of the disobedient act must be to secure rec-
ognition of a legal change that is consistent with the general
objectives of the Agreement [GATT].... ii) Disobedience
undertaken in support of a claim must be preceded by a good
faith effort to achieve the desired legal change by negotia-
174. Id. at 30-31. These arguments are defined as altruistic because they ap-
peal to the reasoning that the United States is not acting in a self-serving man-
ner, but rather is acting in the spirit if not the letter of GATT and the interna-
tional economic community. The argument that unilateralism had to be used in
order to save multilateralism was succinctly summed up by Professor Bhagwati
when he stated that "to save multilateralism, one had to depart from it through
the use of unilateral threat and even actions that would violate the multilateral
obligations defined by GATT." Id.
175. See HUDEC, supra note 140, at 131.
176. Id. at 126.
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tion.... iii) Disobedience must be accompanied by an offer to
continue to negotiate in good faith, with a pledge to termi-
nate the disobedient action upon satisfactory completion of
such negotiations .... iv) The extent of the disobedience must
be limited to that which is necessary to achieve a negotiated
legal reform of the kind needed to solve the problem .... v)
[G]overnments acting out of a concern to improve GATT law
must necessarily respect that law as fully as possible, even
when disobeying it.' 7
The use of section 301 against bribery meets each of these
criteria and, therefore, unilateral action should be allowed. The
across-the-board prohibition of bribery certainly meets the
GATT goal of achieving an equality of rights and responsibili-
ties. The United States has met the "good faith" requirement
by continuing to strive for an international agreement through
the more traditional channels. Moreover, if an international
agreement was achieved, the United States would surely aban-
don any thought of using section 301, since its use would no
longer be necessary. The extent of the disobedience would be
addressed by the limited nature of any potential retaliation.
Finally, an effort to achieve an international agreement con-
cerning bribery by using section 301 is not a condemnation of
GATT, but rather a realistic acknowledgment of its limitations.
The fact that bribery meets each of these proposed criteria
makes it a particularly appropriate situation for justified dis-
obedience.
2. Benign Dictator
The argument forwarded by Professor Bhagwati l'" that
the United States should not act as a benign dictator, 'laying
down its own definition of a desirable trading regime instead of
making (admittedly slower) progress by persuasion and mutual
concessions,"' 9 is not persuasive when dealing with the issue
of bribery for two reasons. First, the efforts at achieving a
multilateral agreement on international bribery have not been
moving "admittedly slower" but, as it has been shown, this
effort has ground to a virtual dead stop. Second, in the area of
177. Id. at 137.
178. Bhagwati, supra note 173, at 36.
179. Id.
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bribery, the United States is not imposing its own definition on
the rest of the international trading community. Most of the
world condemns bribery as wrong. 8 ' All the United States
would be attempting to do by using section 301, in the context
of bribery, is to break down the artificial distinction between
domestic and international bribery which can not be allowed to
exist in the new world trading system.
E. The Use of Section 301 and the World Trade Organization
Another problem the United States must deal with if it
wants to assure continued use of section 301 as a viable threat
to nations conducting unfair trade practices is the World Trade
Organization (WTO), formed at the end of the Uruguay Round
to replace GATT. 8' Although section 301's use can be consis-
tent with the goals of the GATT,'82 the obvious issue that
arises is whether section 301 use is consistent with the WTO.
The WTO's more effective enforcement mechanisms, in con-
trast with the enforcement methods of GATT,'83 could lead to
a renewed attack against any consideration by the United
States of resorting to section 301 action. However, the WTO
should not be viewed as an obstacle to avoid in the ultimate
use of section 301. Rather, the WTO should be viewed as an
opportunity to achieve through international channels the
same goal the United States hopes to accomplish through the
use of section 301.184
The WTO essentially gives the enforcement mechanisms
180. See supra notes 48-68 and accompanying text.
181. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization
[World Trade Organization], GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 13 (1994).
182. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
183. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Re-
form in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 481 (1994) (the dispute settlement
mechanism seems to establish within the GATT for the first time a genuine sys-
tem of enforceable rules and remedies).
184. In other words, the United States attitude towards the post-WTO GATT
should be the same as it is towards the pre-WTO GATT. If bribery can be stopped
through the use of traditional international channels, then it should be done this
way. The goal of the United States is not the use of section 301, but rather the
elimination of bribery in international business. In this respect, the ends justify
the means. However, if the means can be an effective multilateral tool rather than




greater teeth than under the GATT. It is not possible within
the scope of this Note to examine all the revised provisions of
the WTO. However, the essential function of the WTO as it
applies to the use of section 301 is simply to require the Unit-
ed States to comply with one more procedural layer before
resorting to the unilateral application of section 301.1"5 The
biggest difference between the WTO and GATT enforcement
mechanisms appears to be the possibility that this procedural
layer may actually yield substantive results. In other words, if
the enforcement mechanisms of the WTO work as envisioned,
resort to section 301 may be unnecessary. Although it is much
too early to tell how effective the WTO will eventually be, any
success that it achieves will only help to further the United
States' ultimate goal of eliminating bribery as an unfair trade
practice.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to provide a rationale for using
the U.S. law on unfair trade practices to combat bribery in the
international economic order. The consideration of using unfair
trade law was precipitated by the lack of any notable success
in achieving an international agreement through the tradition-
al multilateral channels. Bribery represents a serious problem
to all those nations participating in the international economic
community. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides just
as strong a remedy and it should be implemented if necessary.
However, achieving an international agreement through
the traditional multilateral means should not be abandoned.
Although this route remains the most desirable, it is time that
the United States and the rest of the world realize that it is no
longer the most plausible means of achieving their goal. Use of
section 301 may force the United States to deal with certain
problems and criticisms not associated with traditional multi-
lateral efforts, but it also may provide a solution that until
now has not been possible.
The biggest obstacle the United States may face in using
185. For a complete treatment of this complex issue, see for example,
Lowenfeld supra note 186; Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holner, U.S. Trade Law
and Policy Series No. 24: Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organiza-
tion: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT'L L. 1095 (1994).
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section 301 to combat bribery may be the response that resort-
ing to this particular solution may elicit from the rest of the
world. There are many in the international business communi-
ty that will argue that section 301 can only advance unilateral
interests. The argument of those who dislike section 301 is
essentially that you cannot teach a unilateral dog multilateral
tricks. However, if the United States moves cautiously and
deliberately in its use of section 301 against bribery, there is
no reason why the end result cannot be a winning situation for
all those involved. Countries will have a uniform set of rules to
apply to the practice of bribery, the international business
community will have an atmosphere that will encourage free
and fair trade, and U.S. businesses will be placed on a level
playing field for the first time since the passage of the FCPA.
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